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Whistleblowers played a significant role in reveal-
ing and disrupting corporate malfeasance at the 
beginning of the 21st century, as scandals at corpo-
rations such as Enron and WorldCom came to public 
light through the efforts of whistleblowing employ-
ees. Subsequently, Congress recognized the impor-
tance of whistleblowing and included strong and 
unprecedented anti-retaliation protection for corpo-
rate employees as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (the Act), the mammoth congressional reaction 
to these corporate scandals. 
The Initial Reaction 
After the Act was passed, scholars and whistle-
blower advocates believed that Sarbanes-Oxley whis-
tleblower protections would often result in favor-
able outcomes for whistleblowers. For example, soon 
after the Act’s enactment, Professor Robert Vaughn 
asserted that the statute is “the most important whis-
tleblower protection law in the world.” Tom Devine, 
legal director for the Government Accountability 
Project, a whistleblower advocacy group, described 
the Act as “the promised land. … [T]he law repre-
sents a revolution in corporate freedom of speech 
[that] far surpasses, indeed laps, the rights available 
for government workers.” Taxpayers Against Fraud 
called the statute “the single most effective measure 
possible to prevent recurrences of the Enron debacle 
and similar threats to the nation’s financial markets.” 
The language of Sarbanes-Oxley’s anti-retaliation 
protections justified this initial reaction. Prior to Sar-
banes-Oxley, millions of workers were protected from 
retaliation for revealing corporate wrongdoing only 
sporadically, if at all. The Act now purports to pro-
tect these workers by permitting them to file claims 
with the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration (OSHA), a federal agency that will initially 
investigate such complaints. If OSHA finds that an 
employer retaliated against a whistleblower, the 
Act provides significant remedies for the employee, 
including back-pay, non-economic damages and 
reinstatement. Moreover, the congressionally man-
dated burden of proof for causation favors employees 
more than many retaliation protections. Indeed, a few 
early victories for employees sparked outrage from 
management attorneys, who argued that Sarbanes-
Oxley’s protections were too broad and overly bur-
densome for employers—a sign that perhaps the Act 
provided real protections for whistleblowers. 
The Reality: Low “Win” Rate So Far 
Despite Sarbanes-Oxley’s pro-whistleblower pro-
visions and a few early employee victories, however, 
administrative decisions over the first three years of 
the Act’s life failed to fulfill these expectations that a 
strong anti-retaliation provision would protect whis-
tleblowers. During this time, 491 employees filed Sar-
banes-Oxley complaints with OSHA. OSHA resolved 
361 of these cases and found for employees only 13 
times, a win rate of 3.6 percent. On appeal from 93 
OSHA decisions, Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) in 
the Department of Labor found in favor of six employ-
ees, a win rate of 6.5 percent. 
The win rate is surprisingly low compared to other 
employment-related statutes. For example, even 
though Congress based Sarbanes-Oxley’s protections 
upon the provisions of a whistleblower statute that 
protects airline industry whistleblowers, these air-
line whistleblowers succeeded at more than twice the 
rate of Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers (9.8 percent) 
in OSHA investigations. The EEOC finds for employ-
ees 14.1 percent of the time in sexual harassment cases, 
and 13.0 percent of employees win employment-
related cases in federal court. 
Analyzing the Low Win Rate 
While the low win rate is surprising and impor-
tant, we should also be concerned with the way in 
which OSHA and the ALJs decided Sarbanes-Oxley 
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whistleblower cases. After examining over three 
years worth of cases, I found that there are two expla-
nations for Sarbanes-Oxley’s low employee win rate. 
First, employees frequently lost because OSHA and 
the ALJs determined that a large number of employ-
ees either violated a procedural rule or did not meet 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s statutory requirements as a mat-
ter of law (i.e., the employees did not demonstrate 
that their claim fit within the Act’s legal “boundar-
ies”). Thus, OSHA and the ALJs rejected a large per-
centage of cases (66.7 percent for OSHA, 95.2 percent 
for ALJs) for failing to fit within the legal parame-
ters of a Sarbanes-Oxley claim, thereby avoiding any 
determination of the factual merits of an employee’s 
allegations. 
In so doing, these administrative decision mak-
ers often strictly interpreted Sarbanes-Oxley’s legal 
requirements. For example, whistleblowers rarely 
were equitably excused for missing a procedural 
deadline, such as the statute of limitations. More-
over, although Sarbanes-Oxley applies to a “contrac-
tor, subcontractor, or agent” of any publicly-traded 
company, ALJs consistently determined that the Act 
did not protect employees of privately-held subsid-
iaries and contractors of publicly-traded companies. 
Furthermore, ALJs and the Administrative Review 
Board (ARB) (the last level of administrative review) 
required extraordinary specificity from whistleblow-
ers regarding their disclosure of illegal activity and 
refused to protect whistleblowers who disclosed gen-
eral fraud as opposed to fraud related specifically to 
securities. 
This strict legal scrutiny might have many causes; I 
posit that it likely resulted from the push and pull of 
defining a new statute’s legal boundaries. Employees, 
perhaps relying on expectations generated by schol-
ars and whistleblower advocates, brought claims that 
tested the boundaries of this new statute. Admin-
istrative decision makers responded by interpret-
ing potentially ambiguous provisions of the statute 
narrowly. 
A second reason for the low employee win rate is 
that OSHA tended to misapply Sarbanes-Oxley’s bur-
den of proof for the few cases that survived the agen-
cy’s strict legal scrutiny. Despite a burden of proof 
for causation that clearly favors employees, OSHA 
decided in favor of the employee in only 10.7 percent 
of the cases in which it evaluated the causation ele-
ment of an employee’s allegations (meaning cases in 
which a decision maker determined that the case fell 
within the legal “boundaries” of a Sarbanes-Oxley 
claim). By contrast, when ALJs adjudicated causation, 
employees won 55.6 percent of the time. I suggest that 
OSHA’s regulations and budgetary restraints contrib-
uted to its failure to apply Sarbanes-Oxley’s burden 
of proof appropriately. 
Amending the statute could address the inter-
pretative and investigative problems I identified, 
which would better reflect Congress’ goals of protect-
ing whistleblowers and remedying retaliation. First, 
fully one-third of all employees who lost at the ALJ 
Level and 18 percent who lost at the OSHA Level 
lost because the employee failed to satisfy Sarbanes-
Oxley’s short 90-day statute of limitations. Because 
this procedural issue has little to do with the sub-
stantive merits of the whistleblower’s claim, I suggest 
extending this statute of limitations to a minimum 
of 180 days. This extension will make the Act’s lim-
itations period similar to those found in equivalent 
whistleblower protection statutes and also should 
provide a more reasonable period of time for whistle-
blowers to file complaints. 
Second, the Act’s legal “boundaries” should be 
clarified. When OSHA and the ALJs interpreted Sar-
banes-Oxley’s statutory boundaries, these adminis-
trative decision makers strictly examined two areas 
in particular: whether the respondent was a “covered 
employer” and whether the employee engaged in 
“protected activity.” For example, Congress should 
clarify that the Act protects employees of privately-
held companies when they report fraud at publicly-
traded corporations. Moreover, Congress should 
amend the Act to explicitly overrule administrative 
decisions that require a whistleblower disclosure to 
relate to securities fraud, as opposed to general fraud, 
and decisions that fail to protect employees who 
refuse to engage in illegal activity. OSHA and the 
Office of Administrative Law Judges also should pub-
licize and disseminate certain statistical and substan-
tive information about Sarbanes-Oxley cases in order 
to further clarify their interpretations of the Act’s 
legal protections and to moderate any bias toward a 
particular party. 
Third, the Act’s employee-friendly burden of proof 
regarding causation needs to be revitalized by alter-
ing OSHA’s investigative procedures and providing 
OSHA more investigative resources. As an alterna-
tive, I suggest removing OSHA from its current inves-
tigative role and replacing OSHA’s process with one 
of three substitutes: (1) permitting whistleblowers to 
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file claims directly in federal court; (2) beginning the 
Sarbanes-Oxley administrative process with hearings 
before an ALJ rather than with an OSHA investiga-
tion; or (3) assigning OSHA’s investigative responsi-
bilities to another agency, such as the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). Any of these options 
could address OSHA’s current misapplication of the 
Act’s burden of proof scheme. 
Finally, Sarbanes-Oxley’s failures should cause 
Congress to consider broader whistleblower protec-
tions. For example, Sarbanes-Oxley currently applies 
only to employees of publicly-traded corporations. 
To avoid the difficult line-drawing issues apparent in 
Sarbanes-Oxley administrative decisions, a broader 
whistleblower provision could apply to employers 
with a specific number of employees, which would 
clarify the Act’s applicability by importing a well-
known standard from other employee protection 
statutes. Furthermore, the Act currently protects only 
employees who disclose illegalities related to six spe-
cific areas of federal law. Providing statutory protec-
tions for whistleblowers who report any unlawful 
activity by their employer would clarify the extent of 
protections available to employees. 
Ultimately, Sarbanes-Oxley failed to fulfill the 
great expectations generated by the Act’s purport-
edly strong anti-retaliation protections. This failure 
may be dangerous to efforts for improved corporate 
governance, because the recent corporate scandals 
powerfully reinforced the notion that employees are 
uniquely positioned to identify and to report corpo-
rate misconduct. Employees’ internal placement in 
the corporate structure often provides them with bet-
ter information about wrongdoing than external cor-
porate monitors, such as the government or outside 
attorneys and accountants. 
This monitoring can only be effective, however, 
if the law protects whistleblowers from retaliation. 
Employees will report wrongdoing less frequently 
unless they are given credible assurances that they will 
be safe from retaliation. Unfortunately, during the first 
years of its existence, Sarbanes-Oxley did not suffi-
ciently protect whistleblowers and thus cannot provide 
such assurances. As a result, Sarbanes-Oxley requires 
further congressional and administrative scrutiny in 
order to fulfill Congress’ and employees’ expectations 
that whistleblowers will be protected from retaliation 
for blowing the whistle on corporate malfeasance.
